Subjectivity and objectivity
1st July 2005 Douglas Racionzer
Morality seems to float between ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’.
Subjectivity is a less popular word than objectivity in academic scholarship. Most of the references in books I have read do not mention subjectivity but will usually have a few references to its understood mirror opposite, objectivity. It seems to me that when we think of subjectivity we too often refer to the harshest form of solipsist psychologism suggesting that only the inner thoughts and feelings of a person are being taken as truth. We seem to use the word subjectivity in a taut pairing which places “objectivity” in direct opposition to “subjectivity” especially when this refers to “the truth of the matter” or “the facts”. Objective reality is too often used to refer to truth claims using the most empiricist of standards that all objective reality “is reducible to immediate sense experience and the reports thereof” (Drummond, 1988; p277)
I have a complaint against the use of the terms “subjective and objective” as a paired set of concepts. This is that they do not operate in the same way as other pairings such as “stop and go” or even “father and child”. These are either descriptions or formal names. Someone who has stopped is clearly not going and someone who is going is clearly not stopped. In the latter pairing, a father may also be child and a child may also be a father, but not to the same person (unless we speak of the Godhead). These are formal names, titles if you will and they express a necessary relationship in so far as every father must be a father to a child and every child must have a father (even if it is a renowned English witticism that it is wise man who knows his father).
My complaint with the pairing of subjective and objective as antonyms is that this pairing reduces the conceptual space for the words and may instead better be thought of as opposite ends of a continuum of ideas about reality and truth. It was with some relief that I noticed the words “float between” in the exam question because this allows me to place objectivity in a continuum with subjectivity.
My readings propose two aspects to the manner in which objectivity and subjectivity are deployed [1] that they invariably placed in relation to some truth claim or some fact. Indeed I cannot recall a circumstance where I have read or heard anyone discussing the objective fantasy of something or the subjective facts of the matter. And [2} that people are in some way acting subjectively and objectively. Objectivity and subjectivity are what people do. Newel argues “that objectivity attaches to persons through their actions” (Newel, 1986; p17)
Newel’s treatment of objectivity presents us with two faces of objectivity. The first is the Kantian sense of objectivity that attaches to ‘objects’ existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time called objective particulars and the beliefs, judgements and products of thought objective judgements. (ibid; p16) “Central to this picture of objectivity is the requirement that beliefs about an objective world must hold good independently of the experiences, or states of mind, on which people may rely for their assertion.” (ibid; p17)
Newel’s second face of objectivity is the one that attaches to persons in that their judgements are “associated with impartiality, detachments, disinterestedness and a willingness to submit to standards of evidence”. (ibid; p 17) In this view “objectivity becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does.” (ibid; p18)
Newel goes on to reject the first face of objectivity because it is essentially sterile and is unable to add us anything new or useful to our understanding of what things really are. (ibid; p 19) Instead we are urged to consider the socially embedded face of objectivity as it us used to deal with concerns between people.
“The route to objectivity has been historically marked by a search for some common ground guaranteeing interpersonal discussion and the settlement of differences. That an explanation of objectivity must pick out this common ground is implicit in the thesis that it is to be found in a world of external realities, but the postulation of common ground outside offered an impersonal basis and failed to be explanatory. The alternative of looking favourably towards agreement or consensus…makes access to objectivity dependent upon the things we consensually believe, trapping objectivity in the bias of agreed wisdom.” (Newel, 1986; p101)
This suggests that we regard objectivity as enacted between people in a kind of inter-subjective engagement between people. But how then can we ever know the truth if objectivity is merely some sort of social agreement between members of a social context ?
Raising questions about “the truth” and its know-ability lies beneath the surface of so much discussion around objectivity and subjectivity that it may serve us to examine various arguments concerning truth.
It is a confusing enterprise to read philosophical literature on truth. Descriptive labels abound; correspondence theories jostle with coherence theories and realist approaches mingle with contructivists, relativists seem to take issue with foundationalism. The literature seems to, to the novice, to be in a mess. This may not be a bad thing, except when you are expected to write a pithy essay for an examination question on the foundation of ethics. As an aide-memoir I often find it convenient to grasp the essentials of the various positions in a field of knowledge using boxes into which various positions can be sorted.
When considering truth, there seem to be at least four basic positions with regard to its universal and its external character that may be adopted ;
[A]Foundationalism + Correspondence [B]Foundationalism + Coherence
[C]Relativism + Correspondence [D]Relativism + Coherence
The arguments about truth that we may cram into box [A] represent a variety of theories that have been identified as; Truth is a copy (Langer, 1948) that is, truth is a mental reflection of some external substance; Truth is an image or images (Hume, 1927; Locke, 1894) which imprint themselves in our minds; Truth is a reflex (Austin in Nagel and Brandt, 1965; pp161-176), that subsists in the properties of things and situations in the world; Truth is a test (James, 1949; Pierce; 1960) in so far as truth is something that we can verify as true as opposed to untrue.
These approaches to truth are, in my experience, the most commonly held especially among fellow church-goers and those of my circle who are natural and social scientists or professional engineers and lawyers.
Vardy etal (1999) argues that “realists operate with a correspondence theory of truth” (ibid; p 15) but “Constructivists operate with the Coherence theory of truth” (ibid; p 17). We can then equate Vardy etal’s (ibid) “realism” with correspondence theories of truth and “constructivism” with coherence theories of truth.
Vardy etal (ibid) assure us that there are those who promote Coherence theories of truth within a foundationalist perspective. These coherence theory foundationalists “maintain that although the truth of moral statements is dependent upon the evidence for these statements (i.e. on coherence), this evidence should not be confined within a particular time or a particular society –instead there is or should be a single set of true moral statements…” (ibid; p 18) Adherents of these positions to truth would fall into box [B] above.
Box [D] above corrals those who are coherence theory relativists. “Such people may consider moral statements to be subjective because they depend on the views of a particular group of people” (ibid; p19)
It is the population of box [C] that reflects the position to which I am most drawn. McHugh calls this approach “Analytic Truth or truth as method” and argues… “that a finding is ‘true’ (or false of ambiguous) comes to be so only after applying to it the analytical formulation of a method by which that finding could be understood to have been produced” (McHugh, 1971;p 332)
Husserl may, according to some , have belonged to this box [C] of relativists who maintained some form of foundationalism; “Truth then, does not involve the ideal of adequation between an idea or judgement and a state of affairs; it involves instead recognized identity” (Drummond, 1988; p 294)
Those who argue for relativism from within a foundationalist perspective tend to focus on the personal ontological experience of truth over its external reification, emphasise method or process as an intentional act and seem to claim that despite the contents of moral (and other) truths being different in time and space, the methods of making sense, of grasping truth are nonetheless universal.
This methodological emphasis has a champion outside of the German phenomenological school in Bernard Lonergan (Morelli etal, 1997). Lonergan’s treatment of objectivity offers one of many arguments for the process of what he calls “self-appropriation”. (ibid; p19)
“Principally the notion of objectivity is contained within a patterned context of judgements which serve as implicit definitions of the terms ’object’, ‘subject’. (Morelli etal, 1997; p212)
Lonergan argues that objectivity is made up of three aspects;
Absolute Objectivity on the level of judgement, Normative Objectivity on the level of understanding and Experiential Objectivity on the level of experience. (ibid, 1997;p 211)
Lonerganian subjectivity is a method of self-appropriation and authentic existence and makes use of intersubjective understandings and common-sense stocks of knowledge in order to operate. (ibid, 1997; p131)
The resolution of the objectivity-subjectivity-truth debates must occur on the horizon of personal and interpersonal meaning. “Meaning is the truth about oneself which creates the preconceptual horizon for moral knowledge and experience…Meaning has a narrative structure; our being-in-the-world is a being-with others-in-the-world.” (Kopfensteiner, 1992;48)
Bibliography and References
(Please note that I have included material that I have read that may not be directly referenced in the paper because I believe that my understanding of the topic has involved a wider reading than the texts quoted)
Atkinson, Paul Understanding Ethnographic Texts: Qualitative Research Methods Series 25 1992 Sage Publications London
Bachrach, Peter The Theory of Democratic Elitism 1967 Little, Brown and Company Boston
Beauchamp, Tom.L. Philosphical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy 2001 3rd Edition McGraw Hill Boston
Bretzke, James, T A Morally Complex World: Engaging Contemporary Moral Theology 2004 Liturgical Press Collegeville, Minnestota
Buzan, T The Evolving Brain 1976 Plume New York
Casey, M.A. Meaninglessness: The solutions of Nietzsche, Freud and Rorty 2002 Lexington Books Oxford
Cicourel, Aaron Cognitive Sociology 1973 Penguin Educational Harmondsworth, Middlesex
Cohen, Josh Interrupting Auschwitz 2003 Continuum London
Collins, Jeff Heidegger and the Nazis 2000 Icon Books Cambridge
Constitutional Assembly of South Africa The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 Government Printer Pretoria
Dallman, Hans-Ulrich Niklas Luhmann's Systems Theory as a Challenge for Ethics in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice; pp85-102 Vol.1 1998
Donohoe, Janet Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: From Static to Genetic Phenomenology 2004 Humanity Books New York
Drummond, John. J Modernism and Postmodernism: Bernstein or Husserl in Review of Metaphysics Vol 42, 1988; pp275-300 1988
Gadamer, Hans-Georg Truth and Method 2003 2nd edition, Translated by Weinsheimer, J and Marshall, D.G. Continuum Publishing New York
Gadamer, Hans-Georg Philosophical Hermeneutics 1977 First paperback edition; 1977. Tanslatede by David E. Linge University of California Press Berkerley and Los Angeles
Garfinkel, H A conception of, and experiments with, 'trust' as a condition of stable concerted actions in O.J. Harvey (ed) Motivation and Social Interaction; pp187-238 1963 Ronald Press New York
Gouldner, Alvin. W The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology 1971 Heinemann London
Gribbin, John Almost Everyone's Guide to Science: The Universe, Science and Everything 1998 Weidenfeld & Nicolson London
Hand, Sean (ed) The Levinas Reader 1989 Blackwell Oxford
Heidegger, Martin The Concept of Time 1989 Translated by McNeill, W. Blackwell Oxford
Heritage, John Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology 1984 Blackwell Oxford
Hughes, Gerald, J Natural Law in Hoose, B.(ed) Christian Ethics: An Introduction; pp47-56 1998 Cassell London
Husserl, Edmund Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology 1962 Translated by Boyce-Gibson. W.R. Collier Books New York
Husserl, Edmund Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy 1965 Translated by Lauer, Q Harper and Row London
Jamieson, Dale Method and Moral Theory in Singer, P (ed) A Companion to Ethics, pp 476-87 1991
Jans, Jan Neither Punishment nor Reward: Divine Gratuitousness and Moral Order in Concilium 2004/4: van Wolde, E (ed)Job's God; pp83-92 2004
Jans, Jan Notes of Lectures on Foundation of Ethics 2005 Unpublished Johannesburg
Junker-Kenny, Maureen Christian Morality in Contemporary Culture: Tasks, Choices and Modes of Communication in Bulletin ET; pp 117-32, Vol 12 2001
Kogler, Hans Herbert The Power of Dialogue 1999 Translated by Paul Hendrickson MIT Press Cambridge, Mass.
Kopfensteiner, Thomas, R Historical Epistemology and Moral Progress in Heythrop Journal; pp45-60, Vol 33 1992
Kripke, Saul Naming and Necessity 198 2nd edition Blackwell Oxford
Lesch, Walter Media Ethics as a Cultural Diagnosis of the Times in Patteyn, B (ed) Media Ethics: Opening Social Dialogue;pp 179-97 2000 Peeters Leuwen
Levinson, Stephen.C Pragmatics 1983 Cambridge University Press Cambridge
Lieb, Irwin, C The Ontological Standing of the Laws of Nature in Review of Metaphysics, Vol 39; pp 227-241 1985
Lonergan, B Insight: A study in human understanding 1992 5th edition: Eds; F. Crowe & R. Doran University of Toronto Press Toronto
McHugh, Peter On the Failure of Positivism Ch.12 in Jack D. Douglas Understanding Everyday Life 1971 Routledge and Kegan Paul London
Morelli, M.D and Morelli, E.A The Lonergan Reader 1997 University of Toronto Press Toronto
Newell, R.W. Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth 1986 Routledge and Kegan Paul London
Nietzche, Freiderich A Nietzsche Reader 1977 2nd edition 2003Selected and translated by Hollingdale, R.J. Penguin London
Parsons, Susan. F Feminist Ethics in Hoose, B (ed) Christian Ethics: An Introduction; pp135-48 1998 Cassell London
Porter, Jean Virtue Ethics in Gill, R (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics; pp96-109 2001 Cambridge University Press Cambridge
Porter, Jean The Recovery of Virtue 1994 SPCK London
Richards, Janet Radcliffe Separate Spheres in Applied Ethics Ch12; pp 185- 214 1986 Oxford University Press Oxford
Ricoeur, Paul Oneself as Another 1990 Translated by Kathleen Blamey University of Chicago Press Chicago
Schutz, Alfred Life Forms and Meaning Structure 1982 Translated by Wagner, H.R. Routledge and Kegan Paul London
Schutz, Alfred The Phenonemology of the Social World 1972 Translated by Walsh, G and Lehnert, F Heinemann London
Sharrock, Wes and Anderson, Bob The Ethnomethodologists 1986 Ellis Horwood Chichester, Sussex
Silverman, David Qualitative Methodology & Sociology 1985 Gower Publishing Aldreshot, England
Singer, Peter (Ed) Applied Ethics 1986 Oxford University Press Oxford
Solomon, Robert.C Business Ethics in Singer, P (ed) A Companion to Ethics, pp354-65 1991 Blackwell Oxford
Taylor, Charles Sources of the Self 1989 Harvard University Press Cambridge, Mass.
Taylor, Charles The Malaise of Modernity 1991 House of Anansi Press Concord, Ontario
Toulmin, Stephen How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine; pp736-50, Vol. 25 Apr-82
Urban Walker, Margaret Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics 1998 Routledge New York
Vardy, Peter and Grosch, Paul The Puzzle of Ethics 1994 M.E.Sharpe, New York, 1997 First published by Fount Paperbacks London
Warner, Marina Joan of Arc: The image of female heroisim 1981 Penguin London
Warnock, Mary Ethics Since 1900 1978 3rd Edition Oxford University Press Oxford
Wils, Jeane-Pierre Ethics and Modernity in Derkse etal (eds) In Quest of Humanity in a Globalising World: Dutch Contributions to the Jubilee of Universities in Rome 2000; pp139-54 2000 Damon Leende
Wippel, John, F Thomas Aquinas on the distinction and derivation of the many from the one: A dialectic between being and nonbeing in Review of Metaphysics, Vol 38; pp 563- 590 1985
Morality seems to float between ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’.
Subjectivity is a less popular word than objectivity in academic scholarship. Most of the references in books I have read do not mention subjectivity but will usually have a few references to its understood mirror opposite, objectivity. It seems to me that when we think of subjectivity we too often refer to the harshest form of solipsist psychologism suggesting that only the inner thoughts and feelings of a person are being taken as truth. We seem to use the word subjectivity in a taut pairing which places “objectivity” in direct opposition to “subjectivity” especially when this refers to “the truth of the matter” or “the facts”. Objective reality is too often used to refer to truth claims using the most empiricist of standards that all objective reality “is reducible to immediate sense experience and the reports thereof” (Drummond, 1988; p277)
I have a complaint against the use of the terms “subjective and objective” as a paired set of concepts. This is that they do not operate in the same way as other pairings such as “stop and go” or even “father and child”. These are either descriptions or formal names. Someone who has stopped is clearly not going and someone who is going is clearly not stopped. In the latter pairing, a father may also be child and a child may also be a father, but not to the same person (unless we speak of the Godhead). These are formal names, titles if you will and they express a necessary relationship in so far as every father must be a father to a child and every child must have a father (even if it is a renowned English witticism that it is wise man who knows his father).
My complaint with the pairing of subjective and objective as antonyms is that this pairing reduces the conceptual space for the words and may instead better be thought of as opposite ends of a continuum of ideas about reality and truth. It was with some relief that I noticed the words “float between” in the exam question because this allows me to place objectivity in a continuum with subjectivity.
My readings propose two aspects to the manner in which objectivity and subjectivity are deployed [1] that they invariably placed in relation to some truth claim or some fact. Indeed I cannot recall a circumstance where I have read or heard anyone discussing the objective fantasy of something or the subjective facts of the matter. And [2} that people are in some way acting subjectively and objectively. Objectivity and subjectivity are what people do. Newel argues “that objectivity attaches to persons through their actions” (Newel, 1986; p17)
Newel’s treatment of objectivity presents us with two faces of objectivity. The first is the Kantian sense of objectivity that attaches to ‘objects’ existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time called objective particulars and the beliefs, judgements and products of thought objective judgements. (ibid; p16) “Central to this picture of objectivity is the requirement that beliefs about an objective world must hold good independently of the experiences, or states of mind, on which people may rely for their assertion.” (ibid; p17)
Newel’s second face of objectivity is the one that attaches to persons in that their judgements are “associated with impartiality, detachments, disinterestedness and a willingness to submit to standards of evidence”. (ibid; p 17) In this view “objectivity becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does.” (ibid; p18)
Newel goes on to reject the first face of objectivity because it is essentially sterile and is unable to add us anything new or useful to our understanding of what things really are. (ibid; p 19) Instead we are urged to consider the socially embedded face of objectivity as it us used to deal with concerns between people.
“The route to objectivity has been historically marked by a search for some common ground guaranteeing interpersonal discussion and the settlement of differences. That an explanation of objectivity must pick out this common ground is implicit in the thesis that it is to be found in a world of external realities, but the postulation of common ground outside offered an impersonal basis and failed to be explanatory. The alternative of looking favourably towards agreement or consensus…makes access to objectivity dependent upon the things we consensually believe, trapping objectivity in the bias of agreed wisdom.” (Newel, 1986; p101)
This suggests that we regard objectivity as enacted between people in a kind of inter-subjective engagement between people. But how then can we ever know the truth if objectivity is merely some sort of social agreement between members of a social context ?
Raising questions about “the truth” and its know-ability lies beneath the surface of so much discussion around objectivity and subjectivity that it may serve us to examine various arguments concerning truth.
It is a confusing enterprise to read philosophical literature on truth. Descriptive labels abound; correspondence theories jostle with coherence theories and realist approaches mingle with contructivists, relativists seem to take issue with foundationalism. The literature seems to, to the novice, to be in a mess. This may not be a bad thing, except when you are expected to write a pithy essay for an examination question on the foundation of ethics. As an aide-memoir I often find it convenient to grasp the essentials of the various positions in a field of knowledge using boxes into which various positions can be sorted.
When considering truth, there seem to be at least four basic positions with regard to its universal and its external character that may be adopted ;
[A]Foundationalism + Correspondence [B]Foundationalism + Coherence
[C]Relativism + Correspondence [D]Relativism + Coherence
The arguments about truth that we may cram into box [A] represent a variety of theories that have been identified as; Truth is a copy (Langer, 1948) that is, truth is a mental reflection of some external substance; Truth is an image or images (Hume, 1927; Locke, 1894) which imprint themselves in our minds; Truth is a reflex (Austin in Nagel and Brandt, 1965; pp161-176), that subsists in the properties of things and situations in the world; Truth is a test (James, 1949; Pierce; 1960) in so far as truth is something that we can verify as true as opposed to untrue.
These approaches to truth are, in my experience, the most commonly held especially among fellow church-goers and those of my circle who are natural and social scientists or professional engineers and lawyers.
Vardy etal (1999) argues that “realists operate with a correspondence theory of truth” (ibid; p 15) but “Constructivists operate with the Coherence theory of truth” (ibid; p 17). We can then equate Vardy etal’s (ibid) “realism” with correspondence theories of truth and “constructivism” with coherence theories of truth.
Vardy etal (ibid) assure us that there are those who promote Coherence theories of truth within a foundationalist perspective. These coherence theory foundationalists “maintain that although the truth of moral statements is dependent upon the evidence for these statements (i.e. on coherence), this evidence should not be confined within a particular time or a particular society –instead there is or should be a single set of true moral statements…” (ibid; p 18) Adherents of these positions to truth would fall into box [B] above.
Box [D] above corrals those who are coherence theory relativists. “Such people may consider moral statements to be subjective because they depend on the views of a particular group of people” (ibid; p19)
It is the population of box [C] that reflects the position to which I am most drawn. McHugh calls this approach “Analytic Truth or truth as method” and argues… “that a finding is ‘true’ (or false of ambiguous) comes to be so only after applying to it the analytical formulation of a method by which that finding could be understood to have been produced” (McHugh, 1971;p 332)
Husserl may, according to some , have belonged to this box [C] of relativists who maintained some form of foundationalism; “Truth then, does not involve the ideal of adequation between an idea or judgement and a state of affairs; it involves instead recognized identity” (Drummond, 1988; p 294)
Those who argue for relativism from within a foundationalist perspective tend to focus on the personal ontological experience of truth over its external reification, emphasise method or process as an intentional act and seem to claim that despite the contents of moral (and other) truths being different in time and space, the methods of making sense, of grasping truth are nonetheless universal.
This methodological emphasis has a champion outside of the German phenomenological school in Bernard Lonergan (Morelli etal, 1997). Lonergan’s treatment of objectivity offers one of many arguments for the process of what he calls “self-appropriation”. (ibid; p19)
“Principally the notion of objectivity is contained within a patterned context of judgements which serve as implicit definitions of the terms ’object’, ‘subject’. (Morelli etal, 1997; p212)
Lonergan argues that objectivity is made up of three aspects;
Absolute Objectivity on the level of judgement, Normative Objectivity on the level of understanding and Experiential Objectivity on the level of experience. (ibid, 1997;p 211)
Lonerganian subjectivity is a method of self-appropriation and authentic existence and makes use of intersubjective understandings and common-sense stocks of knowledge in order to operate. (ibid, 1997; p131)
The resolution of the objectivity-subjectivity-truth debates must occur on the horizon of personal and interpersonal meaning. “Meaning is the truth about oneself which creates the preconceptual horizon for moral knowledge and experience…Meaning has a narrative structure; our being-in-the-world is a being-with others-in-the-world.” (Kopfensteiner, 1992;48)
Bibliography and References
(Please note that I have included material that I have read that may not be directly referenced in the paper because I believe that my understanding of the topic has involved a wider reading than the texts quoted)
Atkinson, Paul Understanding Ethnographic Texts: Qualitative Research Methods Series 25 1992 Sage Publications London
Bachrach, Peter The Theory of Democratic Elitism 1967 Little, Brown and Company Boston
Beauchamp, Tom.L. Philosphical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy 2001 3rd Edition McGraw Hill Boston
Bretzke, James, T A Morally Complex World: Engaging Contemporary Moral Theology 2004 Liturgical Press Collegeville, Minnestota
Buzan, T The Evolving Brain 1976 Plume New York
Casey, M.A. Meaninglessness: The solutions of Nietzsche, Freud and Rorty 2002 Lexington Books Oxford
Cicourel, Aaron Cognitive Sociology 1973 Penguin Educational Harmondsworth, Middlesex
Cohen, Josh Interrupting Auschwitz 2003 Continuum London
Collins, Jeff Heidegger and the Nazis 2000 Icon Books Cambridge
Constitutional Assembly of South Africa The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 Government Printer Pretoria
Dallman, Hans-Ulrich Niklas Luhmann's Systems Theory as a Challenge for Ethics in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice; pp85-102 Vol.1 1998
Donohoe, Janet Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: From Static to Genetic Phenomenology 2004 Humanity Books New York
Drummond, John. J Modernism and Postmodernism: Bernstein or Husserl in Review of Metaphysics Vol 42, 1988; pp275-300 1988
Gadamer, Hans-Georg Truth and Method 2003 2nd edition, Translated by Weinsheimer, J and Marshall, D.G. Continuum Publishing New York
Gadamer, Hans-Georg Philosophical Hermeneutics 1977 First paperback edition; 1977. Tanslatede by David E. Linge University of California Press Berkerley and Los Angeles
Garfinkel, H A conception of, and experiments with, 'trust' as a condition of stable concerted actions in O.J. Harvey (ed) Motivation and Social Interaction; pp187-238 1963 Ronald Press New York
Gouldner, Alvin. W The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology 1971 Heinemann London
Gribbin, John Almost Everyone's Guide to Science: The Universe, Science and Everything 1998 Weidenfeld & Nicolson London
Hand, Sean (ed) The Levinas Reader 1989 Blackwell Oxford
Heidegger, Martin The Concept of Time 1989 Translated by McNeill, W. Blackwell Oxford
Heritage, John Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology 1984 Blackwell Oxford
Hughes, Gerald, J Natural Law in Hoose, B.(ed) Christian Ethics: An Introduction; pp47-56 1998 Cassell London
Husserl, Edmund Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology 1962 Translated by Boyce-Gibson. W.R. Collier Books New York
Husserl, Edmund Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy 1965 Translated by Lauer, Q Harper and Row London
Jamieson, Dale Method and Moral Theory in Singer, P (ed) A Companion to Ethics, pp 476-87 1991
Jans, Jan Neither Punishment nor Reward: Divine Gratuitousness and Moral Order in Concilium 2004/4: van Wolde, E (ed)Job's God; pp83-92 2004
Jans, Jan Notes of Lectures on Foundation of Ethics 2005 Unpublished Johannesburg
Junker-Kenny, Maureen Christian Morality in Contemporary Culture: Tasks, Choices and Modes of Communication in Bulletin ET; pp 117-32, Vol 12 2001
Kogler, Hans Herbert The Power of Dialogue 1999 Translated by Paul Hendrickson MIT Press Cambridge, Mass.
Kopfensteiner, Thomas, R Historical Epistemology and Moral Progress in Heythrop Journal; pp45-60, Vol 33 1992
Kripke, Saul Naming and Necessity 198 2nd edition Blackwell Oxford
Lesch, Walter Media Ethics as a Cultural Diagnosis of the Times in Patteyn, B (ed) Media Ethics: Opening Social Dialogue;pp 179-97 2000 Peeters Leuwen
Levinson, Stephen.C Pragmatics 1983 Cambridge University Press Cambridge
Lieb, Irwin, C The Ontological Standing of the Laws of Nature in Review of Metaphysics, Vol 39; pp 227-241 1985
Lonergan, B Insight: A study in human understanding 1992 5th edition: Eds; F. Crowe & R. Doran University of Toronto Press Toronto
McHugh, Peter On the Failure of Positivism Ch.12 in Jack D. Douglas Understanding Everyday Life 1971 Routledge and Kegan Paul London
Morelli, M.D and Morelli, E.A The Lonergan Reader 1997 University of Toronto Press Toronto
Newell, R.W. Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth 1986 Routledge and Kegan Paul London
Nietzche, Freiderich A Nietzsche Reader 1977 2nd edition 2003Selected and translated by Hollingdale, R.J. Penguin London
Parsons, Susan. F Feminist Ethics in Hoose, B (ed) Christian Ethics: An Introduction; pp135-48 1998 Cassell London
Porter, Jean Virtue Ethics in Gill, R (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics; pp96-109 2001 Cambridge University Press Cambridge
Porter, Jean The Recovery of Virtue 1994 SPCK London
Richards, Janet Radcliffe Separate Spheres in Applied Ethics Ch12; pp 185- 214 1986 Oxford University Press Oxford
Ricoeur, Paul Oneself as Another 1990 Translated by Kathleen Blamey University of Chicago Press Chicago
Schutz, Alfred Life Forms and Meaning Structure 1982 Translated by Wagner, H.R. Routledge and Kegan Paul London
Schutz, Alfred The Phenonemology of the Social World 1972 Translated by Walsh, G and Lehnert, F Heinemann London
Sharrock, Wes and Anderson, Bob The Ethnomethodologists 1986 Ellis Horwood Chichester, Sussex
Silverman, David Qualitative Methodology & Sociology 1985 Gower Publishing Aldreshot, England
Singer, Peter (Ed) Applied Ethics 1986 Oxford University Press Oxford
Solomon, Robert.C Business Ethics in Singer, P (ed) A Companion to Ethics, pp354-65 1991 Blackwell Oxford
Taylor, Charles Sources of the Self 1989 Harvard University Press Cambridge, Mass.
Taylor, Charles The Malaise of Modernity 1991 House of Anansi Press Concord, Ontario
Toulmin, Stephen How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine; pp736-50, Vol. 25 Apr-82
Urban Walker, Margaret Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics 1998 Routledge New York
Vardy, Peter and Grosch, Paul The Puzzle of Ethics 1994 M.E.Sharpe, New York, 1997 First published by Fount Paperbacks London
Warner, Marina Joan of Arc: The image of female heroisim 1981 Penguin London
Warnock, Mary Ethics Since 1900 1978 3rd Edition Oxford University Press Oxford
Wils, Jeane-Pierre Ethics and Modernity in Derkse etal (eds) In Quest of Humanity in a Globalising World: Dutch Contributions to the Jubilee of Universities in Rome 2000; pp139-54 2000 Damon Leende
Wippel, John, F Thomas Aquinas on the distinction and derivation of the many from the one: A dialectic between being and nonbeing in Review of Metaphysics, Vol 38; pp 563- 590 1985
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