Anti-Corruption Strategy
Social and political ethics: Power and Corruption
Assignment Examination April 2006
Douglas Racionzer
Outline and justify an anti-corruption strategy for your city/community. Defend your strategy philosophically and politically.
Introduction
One of my favourite topics in conversation is the paradigm under which traffic police across the nation operate. The abuse of traffic and vehicle roadworthy regulations as in effect, an income-generating activity for local municipalities stands as an exemplar of poor governance and criminal myopia. This “stop and fine” approach to traffic policing I will argue lends itself to corruption not least because it places poorly trained and poorly paid officials in positions of power over citizens.
In this paper I shall propose an anti-corruption strategy focussed on the traffic police in my local area, Tshwane and more specifically their perennial roadside “stop and fine” activities .
I shall use Transparency International’s simple definition of corruption :
“Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.”
This definition and its differentiation between “according to rule” corruption and “against the rule” corruption will be discussed as it presents certain features of interest for social theory .
The philosophical underpinnings for the proposed anti-corruption strategy will be discussed. This, it will be argued, lies in stark contrast to the ideological assumptions motivating the traditional “stop and fine” approach to traffic policing. The proposed new paradigm for traffic policing will revolve around a broad ethics of virtue .
A political defence for this proposed anti-corruption strategy will be outlined along with some thoughts about dealing with the ingrained and systemic elements that may oppose such a shift in traffic policing.
Finally, this paper will explore the limitations of this proposed anti-corruption strategy especially with respect to “against the rule” corruption.
The Problem
The local traffic police operating in the Tshwane Metropolitan area often stop vehicles and search for faulty lights, brakes or other problems. They then point out the problem and say “what can we do”. This is the prompt that they are receptive to a bribe. Should you respond by asking what should be done? The police will usually say they are “thirsty” and they would like R20 for a Coke.
If you do not engage with the police at this level, they will invariably write out a fine for the various faults found on the vehicle. Should you become angry they might simply remove your licence disk or even arrest you.
The problem is fundamentally about the power these officials have over the vehicle driver. The encounter may lead in any number of well-worn directions but will almost always end in some form of punishment, fine or bribe .
Proposed anti-corruption strategy
The basic idea for this anti-corruption strategy is to integrate some of the current anti-corruption approaches as championed by Transparency International with a system that seeks to mould driver behaviour, prompting civic virtue on the roads rather than merely punishing vice, thereby shifting the focus and nature of the traffic officer’s job.
Transparency International’s use and promotion of “integrity pacts” in public tender processes seems to offer a very useful tool for application to the corrupt practices of traffic police. The integrity pacts I have looked at entail tender processes for public works and therefore we will have to interpret these models to suit the specific problem of corruption among traffic officials in the Tshwane Metro area.
The use of oath swearing coupled with the signing of integrity pacts may be usefully applied in this context. Oaths have a venerable tradition going back at least to the ancient Hittites and used variously by the Nazi’s as well as the Catholic Church as a means of controlling behaviour, more specifically ensuring loyalty. The oaths we would be proposing are not oaths of loyalty to a person or an organization but rather an oath of loyalty to the general proposal that taking bribes is always wrong.
The specifics of what constitutes bribery and what corruption means may be dealt with by reference to the new anti corruption legislation passed into law in 2004 . Section 4, 1 (a) of Act 12 of 2004 states that “any public officer, who directly or indirectly accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of any other person …” would be guilty of corrupt activities. Traffic officers would merely be asked to sign an integrity pact to the effect that they will not accept any gratification from another person for their own benefit in accord with this section of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.
How the details of this strategy, beyond the oath-taking and integrity pact may be put into practice, would involve the more technical details of transforming the current “stop-and fine” paradigm of traffic policing into a system of rewards for maintaining roadworthy vehicles and good driving. The practical outcome would, for example, entail drivers being issued with rewards for defined and specific civic virtues on the roads that may be redeemed against a variety of municipal charges.
It is a generally accepted psychological principle that the solution to a problem may be found at a level above (beneath or behind) the point where the problem is experienced. Problems are seen as “symptoms” or “presenting problems” for which an underlying process is responsible. The relevance of this truism in this case is that simply to try and deal with corruption at the level that it manifests itself would always place anti-corruption strategies in a reactive rather than a proactive stance. To this end, I propose that the ideological underpinnings that inform the corrupt practices of traffic officers need transformation.
In practical terms, I propose we enable the traffic department to mould driver behaviour using a judicious mix of five distinct tools:
1. A system that encourages the annual signing of public integrity pacts by drivers, vehicle owners and traffic police.
2. The careful and planned use of traffic fines to punish a limited and defined set of priority traffic crimes.
3. The issuing of rewards for specific vehicle and traffic virtues which are redeemable against any number of municipal charges such as rates, light and water bills, vehicle licensing, plumbing, business charges and other services.
4. The planned removal of traffic-calming measures such as speed-humps and other restrictions, commensurate with a reduction in accidents, good driving behaviours and general calming of traffic in a defined community.
5. The creation of traffic-flow systems that do not reward traffic vices, for example, taxi and bus lanes in main thoroughfares to extinguish the ‘reward’ public transport vehicle drivers get for overtaking on the left curb and so on.
The civic virtues of the road may include:
· Specific good driving behaviours, such stopping at stop streets
· Specific safe driving behaviours such using seat belts.
· Specific road courtesy behaviours, such as allowing drivers to overtake on the right by keeping to the left lane
· Specific roadworthy vehicle maintenance, such as good brakes and tyres.
· Specific road navigation virtues, such as driving within the speed limit
· Specific careful driving behaviours, such as overtaking safely
The innovation of Transparency International has been to focus on civil society acting as the “conscience” of business and state interests by insisting upon public, specific and measurable outcomes. Such an approach is crucially important in this proposed exercise. Without civil society participation, coupled with a focussed attention to details and outcomes, no change is measurable and so success or failure cannot be judged.
A suitable civil society vehicle would have to be used to drive this proposed anti-corruption strategy. The Automobile Association, Transparency International, the local taxi-owners association or even one of the civil servants’ unions may host the proposed strategy.
If no suitable civil society host for the strategy can be found, then a non-governmental organization will have to be built with this strategy as its primary programme. Single-issue organizations require specific skills and face peculiar challenges and these would have to be faced in planning for such an organization.
In addition to these problems, the main focus of the strategy is to achieve change in a state-run organization, a local authority. It is common cause that the local sphere of government is poorly led and resourced and has the most organizational problems among the three tiers of government in South Africa. There are consequently specific challenges to such an approach and its ability to induce change in the local authority traffic department is by no means assured.
In any event, the anti-corruption strategy would have to go through a number of stages:
1. The local authority needs to adopt the new strategy as part of its policy and procedures. The planning process works on a five-year cycle. Most important here is that the various income generating departments of the council must accept rewards as credit notes redeem-able against charges. A further strategic alliance would have to be forged with the provincial and national departments responsible for road safety.
2. The administration of the new strategy will have to be prepared and initial outcomes set. Outcomes would include reductions in accidents, measured improvements in driving and traffic problems. Part of the strategy would involve identifying the specific traffic vices and virtues to receive attention, the prioritising of these and defining the reward parameters.
3. Each traffic officer needs to undergo a training course where the principles of the new strategy will be taught and its practical implementation practiced. Using a variant of Transparency International’s tool of integrity pacts, each graduate would be asked to sign an integrity pact and take an oath to not engage in corruption, not to take bribes and rather promote good driving and the various defined traffic-related civic virtues.
4. A series of pilot operations will be carried out with reviews and minor changes to the strategy made. Such changes would involve administrative issues as well as adjustments to the daily regime for traffic officers.
5. The strategy is launched with publicity. The publicity must focus on the idea that people will be rewarded for specific driving and vehicle maintenance virtues. The traffic officer’s names and numbers who have signed the integrity pact would also be published in the local newspapers on an annual basis.
6. Regular public reviews in specific communities will be held to discuss the progress of the strategy. This would involve local councillors as well as traffic chiefs. A major outcome of these meetings will be petitions to alter aspects of traffic management such as traffic-calming measures, speed bumps and the creation of taxi and bus lanes.
7. A general review will be held to assess the applicability of this strategy to other areas of traffic policing. Such areas that may apply would include speed trapping and vehicle licensing.
This proposed strategy is not a short-term project. It requires a long breath and deep pockets. It is attempting to overturn more than half a century of ingrained attitudes, policies and practice.
This proposed strategy is also not a solution to the problem of corruption among traffic officials. It is rather an ongoing management system that speaks to the underlying, embedded narratives and transcripts of power relations. It is an attempt to fashion a new language of power among traffic officers. A language that seeks to account for motorists’ behaviour through this new language of virtue, rather than that of trap and fine motoring vices.
Philosophical underpinnings
The proposed anti-corruption strategy described above does not derive from one clear ethical framework or perspective. It is not merely due to an irritating bias for messy eclecticism that none of my thinking on any subject seems able to fit into any single coherent vision. A student of mine defines the strategic value of this dissolute approach in another context when critiquing the use of Kantian ethics in social work; “(Foucault) claims that the prescriptive nature of moral codes ‘is transmitted in a diffuse manner, so that far from constituting a systematic ensemble, they form a complex interplay of elements that counterbalance and correct one another…thus providing for compromises and loopholes” (Foucault, 1986, p25 in McBeath and Webb, 1989; p501)
Indeed McBeath and Webb (ibid) go on to argue “Foucault asks how the unsystematic ensembles of moral discourses have effects upon the individual as the ‘historical determinants of ethical substance’ (ibid)… That is, individuals are required to think about themselves in particular ways and perform certain reflective operations upon themselves. This means that morality is inscribed on to persons, not by the inner discourse of their own reason as Kant would claim, but by the exterior discourses of morality and what Foucault calls technologies of self… Foucault has described this state of affairs in “Discipline and Punish” (1979) as a prison without a warder. Self-formative codes of morality are inextricably linked to the effects of relations of power which are often discreetly concealed by metaphors of truth and freedom.” (ibid; p502) or in the case of traffic control: “safety” and “courtesy”.
Foucault’s insights may be applied to the anti-corruption strategy proposed here. Essentially the strategy involves re-framing the work of traffic officers to become teachers of prescribed and defined civic virtues of the road. The paradigm of traffic officials working as members of the repressive state apparatus who will transform their work into a “calling” to act as members of the ideological state apparatus. Traffic officers must become identified as arbiters and promoters of civic virtue.
Stace (1956) tells us that Socrates introduced “the identification of virtue with knowledge… All wrongdoing arises from ignorance. If a man only knows what is right, he must and will infallibly do what is right… Aristotle, in commenting upon this whole doctrine, observed that Socrates had ignored or forgotten the irrational parts of the soul.” (Stace, 1956; p 147)
It is however to one of Socrates’ other propositions on virtue that we can trace the philosophical roots of this proposed anti-corruption strategy; “ …that virtue can be taught.” (ibid; p 149) As Stace argues for Socrates, if virtue flows from knowledge and knowledge can be taught, then virtue can be taught.
Perhaps if we saw knowledge as a deeper, wider, more psychological process than simply rational and conscious thought, we could apply the principles of learning that psychology has developed. Introducing the “technologies of self”. (Foucault, 1986; p28)
In particular the work of Pavlov (1927), Watson (1913) and Skinner (1969) who promoted what is generally referred to as the behaviourist school of psychology may have some relevance here. Pavlov infamously discovered the learning process called classical conditioning. He accidentally discovered and then tested his theory on dogs that would have a bell rung whenever they were fed. After some time it was observed that the sound of the bell ringing alone would produce a hunger reaction, salivation in the dogs. Behavourists and learning theorists argue that the dogs had learned to identify food with the sound of the ringing bell.
This proposed anti-corruption strategy will generate a further learning among motorists who, through classical conditioning, will come to associate traffic police with both punishment and reward.
It may be argued that presently, the sight of a traffic police roadblock or even a traffic police vehicle produces a series of fear reactions in motorists because they have undergone classical conditioning where motorists have learned to identify the sight of traffic police with punishment and pain. Learning theory suggests that the identification of a particular stimulus such as the traffic police with pain and punishment produces an avoidance reaction. Freud argues that avoidance of pain leads on to other more complex psychological defences including avoidance, denial, projection, sublimation, repression, reaction formation and other anxiety-related processes. Levitt notes, “among the majority of health professionals, defences against anxiety are currently viewed as necessary, adaptive functions common to all of us. It is doubtful that anyone could develop into a productive, socialized adult without them.” (Levitt, 1968; p 57)
All these “normal” reactions lead motorists inexorably away from the mental and emotional processes necessary to the business of driving safely, of maintaining a roadworthy vehicle, and from civic concerns.
If this proposed anti-corruption strategy can initiate a classical conditioning that, among other tactics, offers rewards for civic virtue, then motorists would not be cued to engage in the complex avoidance reactions at the mere sight of a traffic officer and will be placed in an emotional readiness to improve their driving and vehicle maintenance so as to gain such rewards.
B.F. Skinner (1969) introduced a further aspect to this learning process. This is called operant conditioning. Operant condition seeks to shape behaviour over time using four techniques; positive reinforcement, where desired behaviour is rewarded, for example where motorists receive a reward for driving with set belts buckled; negative reinforcement, where desired behaviour is conditioned through stopping punishment when it is achieved, for example where traffic police no longer seek bribes; punishment; where undesired behaviour is punished for example by issuing fines and extinction; where undesired behaviour has no reward or punishment for example when rude and abusive drivers are ignored by other motorists and traffic police.
This anti-corruption strategy proposes that traffic police apply operant conditioning techniques to shape, over time, the behaviour of motorists. The effect of such a strategy will, if applied consistently and to clearly defined practices, be to improve traffic flows, driving and vehicle roadworthiness. Traffic police will no longer be seen as an object of fear to be avoided but will be seen as teachers of civic virtue on the roads.
When the encounters between traffic officers and motorists no longer set-up the members of these scenes to engage in a dialogue that goes “Pay me a bribe or I will fine you”. When the encounters between traffic officers and motorists are set-up to teach, support, guide and exhort motorists to practice the civic virtues of the road, then the focus of these encounters has been transformed.
When traffic police cease to think of themselves as poorly paid “income generators” for the council and begin to see their work as a calling to promote civic virtue, they will begin to take pride in what they are doing. This pride should be coupled with the oath taking which will be renewed annually at a public ceremony.
Political defence
Applying McBeath and Webb (1989) traffic officers engage in what Said (1978) describes as a colonial discourse; “When traffic officers help motorists in a goal-directed way, they want to change lifestyles and ‘personalities’ by methods of rehabilitation and guidance…. The result is political, in that the motorists’ destiny is annexed to traffic control and thus begins to exist as a series of valorised contacts with the agent of his or her subjugation. In Foucauldian terms, the traffic officer must operate at the intersection of the ‘morality of behaviours’…” (p 503-505)
Politically, the proposed anti-corruption strategy I have outlined in this paper entails the transformation of the traffic officer’s work from one of detection, punishment and control, to include exhortation and reward.
To this end, the annual oath taking and integrity pact-signing ceremonies would have powerful political value. These integrity pacts would fall under the African National Congress’ current rubric of a “people’s contract” or the Democratic Alliance’s campaign for citizen’s charters. These annual events could be used to issue medals for bravery, other valorisations and honours and would be an opportunity for elected representatives to promote in specific examples the idea of citizenship and democracy.
Promoting democracy and the liberal values of our constitution is still needed, it could be argued because the Calvinist roots of the apartheid philosophy that sought to protect the “purity” of the few elect from the impurity of the many, are still operative in our society. The practices of power remain embedded in relations between authority and citizen even though the nationalist philosophy that spawned these practices has been overturned. Morphew (1989) details the national socialist roots of this ideology and how these ideas were expressed as official apartheid policy. Indeed Mophew uses Wink’s (1984 and 1986) work on “the powers” to link political ideology to a theological reading. Something that bears some resemblance to what Scott would later describe as a “hidden transcript” (Scott, 1990).
It may be cogently argued that traffic policing is moulded from this theologically Calvinist, puritanical and nationalist apartheid stance. The new system of governance has regrettably assumed this paradigm with its focus on only punishing vice rather than rewarding virtue. The proposed anti-corruption strategy could be punted as an historical corrective to the internal colonial project of Apartheid.
Politically the creation of a system of governance that rewards virtuous behaviour as well as more efficiently punishing the transgressions of its citizens will transform a pattern of thinking in which currently citizens try to avoid punishment into a culture where citizens seek and expect rewards for civic virtue. This will create more pliable citizens, supportive of the power structures and dynamics of our constitutional democracy while championing the broader, liberal approach to governance.
The power of the local authority will be enhanced through this anti-corruption strategy because it elicits oaths against corruption from its traffic officials and it is looked-to as a source of reward from its citizens.
Other anti-corruption strategies such protection for whistle-blowers and confidential help-desks would not be obstructed by this approach.
Limitations
It may be argued that this proposed anti-corruption strategy would be less effective when dealing with “against the rule” corruption. For example, when traffic officers accept bribes to pass vehicles as roadworthy or when traffic officers accept bribes to issue drivers licences.
It seems pertinent at this point to refer to some of the ethnomethodological research about rules and the documentary method of accounting for action. “In essence, the ‘rule-governed’ model of human conduct is a very simple one. It begins from the presumption that human actors are generally equipped with an array of rules which they ‘follow’ (or by which they are guided or governed) in situations of action. The actual basis on which the actors are proposed to acquire the rules varies from theory to theory... Regardless of how the rules are acquired however, the traditional model of ‘rule-governed’ conduct works in the following fashion. The actors are treated as encountering a situation of action to which one or more of the rules they have learned or internalised ‘apply’. Their actions in this context are then analysed as ‘guided’ or ‘caused’ by the rules which they have previously acquired…The stultifying effect of this model on the development of the theory of social action can scarcely be overestimated.” (Heritage, 1984; pp104-105)
In like manner, it would be a gross misreading of this paper if the proposed anti-corruption strategy were to be seen simply as a refined method of control in the exercise of state power. As a new system of rules to be applied to motorists, this anti-corruption strategy will and must fail. It will fail because it is not a new set of rules at all but rather a new language to which the actions of traffic officers may be indexed.
In an earlier section of this paper, I referred to incidents where I have been stopped by traffic police and despite having things wrong with my vehicle; I have not been fined but rather sent on my way and told to fix the problem. The traffic officers are usually black and I have spoken Sotho with them and they seem loath to punish a white man who gives them respect and speaks their own language. From one point of view, this may be seen as corruption because a state official has received a gratification (respect) from an offender and has subsequently not fined that offender . This may however also be seen as “good policing” because the officer used his or discretion in this case .
The proposed anti-corruption strategy offers traffic officials a language through which they may account for their actions as good policing and use the negotiated character of traffic police encounters as resources for such “documentary methods”. Heritage traces Garfinkel’s use of this term thus; “Garfinkel derived the term from Mannheim who proposed that the documentary method involves the search for ‘an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of different realizations of meaning… the basic idea had received very considerable theoretical explication at the hands of phenomenologist from Husserl onwards…” (Heritage, 1984; p84)
These arguments allow us to understand that Transparency International’s distinction between “with the rule corruption” and “against the rule corruption” cannot be applied should this proposed anti-corruption strategy succeed. The proposed new language that will be introduced makes all corruption rule-based and clearly accountable as traffic police work.
Conclusion
Corruption for me is more than the manner in which state employees abuse their authority for personal gain. Corruption refers to the wider state of our lives and our social reality. To be corrupt is part of the essential character of our existence. Corruption is a meaning to which any number of social actions and contexts may be competently indexed. Any action we do may be seen as corrupt if we can see that we use our positions of trust for our own gratification.
Corruption is rather a negotiated social reality in which we come to understand our actions and others as immoral or unethical. Any anti-corruption strategy must take seriously the negotiated character of social life if it is to address corruption in our society.
The proposed anti-corruption strategy outlined in this paper offers a new language and a more plastic paradigm for traffic official and motorists to work with. The language of civic virtue may offer us a means for us to become more comfortable with ourselves as a people.
Bibliography and References
(Please note that I have included material that I have read that may not be directly referenced in the paper because I believe that my understanding of the topic has involved a wider reading than the texts quoted)
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Assignment Examination April 2006
Douglas Racionzer
Outline and justify an anti-corruption strategy for your city/community. Defend your strategy philosophically and politically.
Introduction
One of my favourite topics in conversation is the paradigm under which traffic police across the nation operate. The abuse of traffic and vehicle roadworthy regulations as in effect, an income-generating activity for local municipalities stands as an exemplar of poor governance and criminal myopia. This “stop and fine” approach to traffic policing I will argue lends itself to corruption not least because it places poorly trained and poorly paid officials in positions of power over citizens.
In this paper I shall propose an anti-corruption strategy focussed on the traffic police in my local area, Tshwane and more specifically their perennial roadside “stop and fine” activities .
I shall use Transparency International’s simple definition of corruption :
“Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.”
This definition and its differentiation between “according to rule” corruption and “against the rule” corruption will be discussed as it presents certain features of interest for social theory .
The philosophical underpinnings for the proposed anti-corruption strategy will be discussed. This, it will be argued, lies in stark contrast to the ideological assumptions motivating the traditional “stop and fine” approach to traffic policing. The proposed new paradigm for traffic policing will revolve around a broad ethics of virtue .
A political defence for this proposed anti-corruption strategy will be outlined along with some thoughts about dealing with the ingrained and systemic elements that may oppose such a shift in traffic policing.
Finally, this paper will explore the limitations of this proposed anti-corruption strategy especially with respect to “against the rule” corruption.
The Problem
The local traffic police operating in the Tshwane Metropolitan area often stop vehicles and search for faulty lights, brakes or other problems. They then point out the problem and say “what can we do”. This is the prompt that they are receptive to a bribe. Should you respond by asking what should be done? The police will usually say they are “thirsty” and they would like R20 for a Coke.
If you do not engage with the police at this level, they will invariably write out a fine for the various faults found on the vehicle. Should you become angry they might simply remove your licence disk or even arrest you.
The problem is fundamentally about the power these officials have over the vehicle driver. The encounter may lead in any number of well-worn directions but will almost always end in some form of punishment, fine or bribe .
Proposed anti-corruption strategy
The basic idea for this anti-corruption strategy is to integrate some of the current anti-corruption approaches as championed by Transparency International with a system that seeks to mould driver behaviour, prompting civic virtue on the roads rather than merely punishing vice, thereby shifting the focus and nature of the traffic officer’s job.
Transparency International’s use and promotion of “integrity pacts” in public tender processes seems to offer a very useful tool for application to the corrupt practices of traffic police. The integrity pacts I have looked at entail tender processes for public works and therefore we will have to interpret these models to suit the specific problem of corruption among traffic officials in the Tshwane Metro area.
The use of oath swearing coupled with the signing of integrity pacts may be usefully applied in this context. Oaths have a venerable tradition going back at least to the ancient Hittites and used variously by the Nazi’s as well as the Catholic Church as a means of controlling behaviour, more specifically ensuring loyalty. The oaths we would be proposing are not oaths of loyalty to a person or an organization but rather an oath of loyalty to the general proposal that taking bribes is always wrong.
The specifics of what constitutes bribery and what corruption means may be dealt with by reference to the new anti corruption legislation passed into law in 2004 . Section 4, 1 (a) of Act 12 of 2004 states that “any public officer, who directly or indirectly accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of any other person …” would be guilty of corrupt activities. Traffic officers would merely be asked to sign an integrity pact to the effect that they will not accept any gratification from another person for their own benefit in accord with this section of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.
How the details of this strategy, beyond the oath-taking and integrity pact may be put into practice, would involve the more technical details of transforming the current “stop-and fine” paradigm of traffic policing into a system of rewards for maintaining roadworthy vehicles and good driving. The practical outcome would, for example, entail drivers being issued with rewards for defined and specific civic virtues on the roads that may be redeemed against a variety of municipal charges.
It is a generally accepted psychological principle that the solution to a problem may be found at a level above (beneath or behind) the point where the problem is experienced. Problems are seen as “symptoms” or “presenting problems” for which an underlying process is responsible. The relevance of this truism in this case is that simply to try and deal with corruption at the level that it manifests itself would always place anti-corruption strategies in a reactive rather than a proactive stance. To this end, I propose that the ideological underpinnings that inform the corrupt practices of traffic officers need transformation.
In practical terms, I propose we enable the traffic department to mould driver behaviour using a judicious mix of five distinct tools:
1. A system that encourages the annual signing of public integrity pacts by drivers, vehicle owners and traffic police.
2. The careful and planned use of traffic fines to punish a limited and defined set of priority traffic crimes.
3. The issuing of rewards for specific vehicle and traffic virtues which are redeemable against any number of municipal charges such as rates, light and water bills, vehicle licensing, plumbing, business charges and other services.
4. The planned removal of traffic-calming measures such as speed-humps and other restrictions, commensurate with a reduction in accidents, good driving behaviours and general calming of traffic in a defined community.
5. The creation of traffic-flow systems that do not reward traffic vices, for example, taxi and bus lanes in main thoroughfares to extinguish the ‘reward’ public transport vehicle drivers get for overtaking on the left curb and so on.
The civic virtues of the road may include:
· Specific good driving behaviours, such stopping at stop streets
· Specific safe driving behaviours such using seat belts.
· Specific road courtesy behaviours, such as allowing drivers to overtake on the right by keeping to the left lane
· Specific roadworthy vehicle maintenance, such as good brakes and tyres.
· Specific road navigation virtues, such as driving within the speed limit
· Specific careful driving behaviours, such as overtaking safely
The innovation of Transparency International has been to focus on civil society acting as the “conscience” of business and state interests by insisting upon public, specific and measurable outcomes. Such an approach is crucially important in this proposed exercise. Without civil society participation, coupled with a focussed attention to details and outcomes, no change is measurable and so success or failure cannot be judged.
A suitable civil society vehicle would have to be used to drive this proposed anti-corruption strategy. The Automobile Association, Transparency International, the local taxi-owners association or even one of the civil servants’ unions may host the proposed strategy.
If no suitable civil society host for the strategy can be found, then a non-governmental organization will have to be built with this strategy as its primary programme. Single-issue organizations require specific skills and face peculiar challenges and these would have to be faced in planning for such an organization.
In addition to these problems, the main focus of the strategy is to achieve change in a state-run organization, a local authority. It is common cause that the local sphere of government is poorly led and resourced and has the most organizational problems among the three tiers of government in South Africa. There are consequently specific challenges to such an approach and its ability to induce change in the local authority traffic department is by no means assured.
In any event, the anti-corruption strategy would have to go through a number of stages:
1. The local authority needs to adopt the new strategy as part of its policy and procedures. The planning process works on a five-year cycle. Most important here is that the various income generating departments of the council must accept rewards as credit notes redeem-able against charges. A further strategic alliance would have to be forged with the provincial and national departments responsible for road safety.
2. The administration of the new strategy will have to be prepared and initial outcomes set. Outcomes would include reductions in accidents, measured improvements in driving and traffic problems. Part of the strategy would involve identifying the specific traffic vices and virtues to receive attention, the prioritising of these and defining the reward parameters.
3. Each traffic officer needs to undergo a training course where the principles of the new strategy will be taught and its practical implementation practiced. Using a variant of Transparency International’s tool of integrity pacts, each graduate would be asked to sign an integrity pact and take an oath to not engage in corruption, not to take bribes and rather promote good driving and the various defined traffic-related civic virtues.
4. A series of pilot operations will be carried out with reviews and minor changes to the strategy made. Such changes would involve administrative issues as well as adjustments to the daily regime for traffic officers.
5. The strategy is launched with publicity. The publicity must focus on the idea that people will be rewarded for specific driving and vehicle maintenance virtues. The traffic officer’s names and numbers who have signed the integrity pact would also be published in the local newspapers on an annual basis.
6. Regular public reviews in specific communities will be held to discuss the progress of the strategy. This would involve local councillors as well as traffic chiefs. A major outcome of these meetings will be petitions to alter aspects of traffic management such as traffic-calming measures, speed bumps and the creation of taxi and bus lanes.
7. A general review will be held to assess the applicability of this strategy to other areas of traffic policing. Such areas that may apply would include speed trapping and vehicle licensing.
This proposed strategy is not a short-term project. It requires a long breath and deep pockets. It is attempting to overturn more than half a century of ingrained attitudes, policies and practice.
This proposed strategy is also not a solution to the problem of corruption among traffic officials. It is rather an ongoing management system that speaks to the underlying, embedded narratives and transcripts of power relations. It is an attempt to fashion a new language of power among traffic officers. A language that seeks to account for motorists’ behaviour through this new language of virtue, rather than that of trap and fine motoring vices.
Philosophical underpinnings
The proposed anti-corruption strategy described above does not derive from one clear ethical framework or perspective. It is not merely due to an irritating bias for messy eclecticism that none of my thinking on any subject seems able to fit into any single coherent vision. A student of mine defines the strategic value of this dissolute approach in another context when critiquing the use of Kantian ethics in social work; “(Foucault) claims that the prescriptive nature of moral codes ‘is transmitted in a diffuse manner, so that far from constituting a systematic ensemble, they form a complex interplay of elements that counterbalance and correct one another…thus providing for compromises and loopholes” (Foucault, 1986, p25 in McBeath and Webb, 1989; p501)
Indeed McBeath and Webb (ibid) go on to argue “Foucault asks how the unsystematic ensembles of moral discourses have effects upon the individual as the ‘historical determinants of ethical substance’ (ibid)… That is, individuals are required to think about themselves in particular ways and perform certain reflective operations upon themselves. This means that morality is inscribed on to persons, not by the inner discourse of their own reason as Kant would claim, but by the exterior discourses of morality and what Foucault calls technologies of self… Foucault has described this state of affairs in “Discipline and Punish” (1979) as a prison without a warder. Self-formative codes of morality are inextricably linked to the effects of relations of power which are often discreetly concealed by metaphors of truth and freedom.” (ibid; p502) or in the case of traffic control: “safety” and “courtesy”.
Foucault’s insights may be applied to the anti-corruption strategy proposed here. Essentially the strategy involves re-framing the work of traffic officers to become teachers of prescribed and defined civic virtues of the road. The paradigm of traffic officials working as members of the repressive state apparatus who will transform their work into a “calling” to act as members of the ideological state apparatus. Traffic officers must become identified as arbiters and promoters of civic virtue.
Stace (1956) tells us that Socrates introduced “the identification of virtue with knowledge… All wrongdoing arises from ignorance. If a man only knows what is right, he must and will infallibly do what is right… Aristotle, in commenting upon this whole doctrine, observed that Socrates had ignored or forgotten the irrational parts of the soul.” (Stace, 1956; p 147)
It is however to one of Socrates’ other propositions on virtue that we can trace the philosophical roots of this proposed anti-corruption strategy; “ …that virtue can be taught.” (ibid; p 149) As Stace argues for Socrates, if virtue flows from knowledge and knowledge can be taught, then virtue can be taught.
Perhaps if we saw knowledge as a deeper, wider, more psychological process than simply rational and conscious thought, we could apply the principles of learning that psychology has developed. Introducing the “technologies of self”. (Foucault, 1986; p28)
In particular the work of Pavlov (1927), Watson (1913) and Skinner (1969) who promoted what is generally referred to as the behaviourist school of psychology may have some relevance here. Pavlov infamously discovered the learning process called classical conditioning. He accidentally discovered and then tested his theory on dogs that would have a bell rung whenever they were fed. After some time it was observed that the sound of the bell ringing alone would produce a hunger reaction, salivation in the dogs. Behavourists and learning theorists argue that the dogs had learned to identify food with the sound of the ringing bell.
This proposed anti-corruption strategy will generate a further learning among motorists who, through classical conditioning, will come to associate traffic police with both punishment and reward.
It may be argued that presently, the sight of a traffic police roadblock or even a traffic police vehicle produces a series of fear reactions in motorists because they have undergone classical conditioning where motorists have learned to identify the sight of traffic police with punishment and pain. Learning theory suggests that the identification of a particular stimulus such as the traffic police with pain and punishment produces an avoidance reaction. Freud argues that avoidance of pain leads on to other more complex psychological defences including avoidance, denial, projection, sublimation, repression, reaction formation and other anxiety-related processes. Levitt notes, “among the majority of health professionals, defences against anxiety are currently viewed as necessary, adaptive functions common to all of us. It is doubtful that anyone could develop into a productive, socialized adult without them.” (Levitt, 1968; p 57)
All these “normal” reactions lead motorists inexorably away from the mental and emotional processes necessary to the business of driving safely, of maintaining a roadworthy vehicle, and from civic concerns.
If this proposed anti-corruption strategy can initiate a classical conditioning that, among other tactics, offers rewards for civic virtue, then motorists would not be cued to engage in the complex avoidance reactions at the mere sight of a traffic officer and will be placed in an emotional readiness to improve their driving and vehicle maintenance so as to gain such rewards.
B.F. Skinner (1969) introduced a further aspect to this learning process. This is called operant conditioning. Operant condition seeks to shape behaviour over time using four techniques; positive reinforcement, where desired behaviour is rewarded, for example where motorists receive a reward for driving with set belts buckled; negative reinforcement, where desired behaviour is conditioned through stopping punishment when it is achieved, for example where traffic police no longer seek bribes; punishment; where undesired behaviour is punished for example by issuing fines and extinction; where undesired behaviour has no reward or punishment for example when rude and abusive drivers are ignored by other motorists and traffic police.
This anti-corruption strategy proposes that traffic police apply operant conditioning techniques to shape, over time, the behaviour of motorists. The effect of such a strategy will, if applied consistently and to clearly defined practices, be to improve traffic flows, driving and vehicle roadworthiness. Traffic police will no longer be seen as an object of fear to be avoided but will be seen as teachers of civic virtue on the roads.
When the encounters between traffic officers and motorists no longer set-up the members of these scenes to engage in a dialogue that goes “Pay me a bribe or I will fine you”. When the encounters between traffic officers and motorists are set-up to teach, support, guide and exhort motorists to practice the civic virtues of the road, then the focus of these encounters has been transformed.
When traffic police cease to think of themselves as poorly paid “income generators” for the council and begin to see their work as a calling to promote civic virtue, they will begin to take pride in what they are doing. This pride should be coupled with the oath taking which will be renewed annually at a public ceremony.
Political defence
Applying McBeath and Webb (1989) traffic officers engage in what Said (1978) describes as a colonial discourse; “When traffic officers help motorists in a goal-directed way, they want to change lifestyles and ‘personalities’ by methods of rehabilitation and guidance…. The result is political, in that the motorists’ destiny is annexed to traffic control and thus begins to exist as a series of valorised contacts with the agent of his or her subjugation. In Foucauldian terms, the traffic officer must operate at the intersection of the ‘morality of behaviours’…” (p 503-505)
Politically, the proposed anti-corruption strategy I have outlined in this paper entails the transformation of the traffic officer’s work from one of detection, punishment and control, to include exhortation and reward.
To this end, the annual oath taking and integrity pact-signing ceremonies would have powerful political value. These integrity pacts would fall under the African National Congress’ current rubric of a “people’s contract” or the Democratic Alliance’s campaign for citizen’s charters. These annual events could be used to issue medals for bravery, other valorisations and honours and would be an opportunity for elected representatives to promote in specific examples the idea of citizenship and democracy.
Promoting democracy and the liberal values of our constitution is still needed, it could be argued because the Calvinist roots of the apartheid philosophy that sought to protect the “purity” of the few elect from the impurity of the many, are still operative in our society. The practices of power remain embedded in relations between authority and citizen even though the nationalist philosophy that spawned these practices has been overturned. Morphew (1989) details the national socialist roots of this ideology and how these ideas were expressed as official apartheid policy. Indeed Mophew uses Wink’s (1984 and 1986) work on “the powers” to link political ideology to a theological reading. Something that bears some resemblance to what Scott would later describe as a “hidden transcript” (Scott, 1990).
It may be cogently argued that traffic policing is moulded from this theologically Calvinist, puritanical and nationalist apartheid stance. The new system of governance has regrettably assumed this paradigm with its focus on only punishing vice rather than rewarding virtue. The proposed anti-corruption strategy could be punted as an historical corrective to the internal colonial project of Apartheid.
Politically the creation of a system of governance that rewards virtuous behaviour as well as more efficiently punishing the transgressions of its citizens will transform a pattern of thinking in which currently citizens try to avoid punishment into a culture where citizens seek and expect rewards for civic virtue. This will create more pliable citizens, supportive of the power structures and dynamics of our constitutional democracy while championing the broader, liberal approach to governance.
The power of the local authority will be enhanced through this anti-corruption strategy because it elicits oaths against corruption from its traffic officials and it is looked-to as a source of reward from its citizens.
Other anti-corruption strategies such protection for whistle-blowers and confidential help-desks would not be obstructed by this approach.
Limitations
It may be argued that this proposed anti-corruption strategy would be less effective when dealing with “against the rule” corruption. For example, when traffic officers accept bribes to pass vehicles as roadworthy or when traffic officers accept bribes to issue drivers licences.
It seems pertinent at this point to refer to some of the ethnomethodological research about rules and the documentary method of accounting for action. “In essence, the ‘rule-governed’ model of human conduct is a very simple one. It begins from the presumption that human actors are generally equipped with an array of rules which they ‘follow’ (or by which they are guided or governed) in situations of action. The actual basis on which the actors are proposed to acquire the rules varies from theory to theory... Regardless of how the rules are acquired however, the traditional model of ‘rule-governed’ conduct works in the following fashion. The actors are treated as encountering a situation of action to which one or more of the rules they have learned or internalised ‘apply’. Their actions in this context are then analysed as ‘guided’ or ‘caused’ by the rules which they have previously acquired…The stultifying effect of this model on the development of the theory of social action can scarcely be overestimated.” (Heritage, 1984; pp104-105)
In like manner, it would be a gross misreading of this paper if the proposed anti-corruption strategy were to be seen simply as a refined method of control in the exercise of state power. As a new system of rules to be applied to motorists, this anti-corruption strategy will and must fail. It will fail because it is not a new set of rules at all but rather a new language to which the actions of traffic officers may be indexed.
In an earlier section of this paper, I referred to incidents where I have been stopped by traffic police and despite having things wrong with my vehicle; I have not been fined but rather sent on my way and told to fix the problem. The traffic officers are usually black and I have spoken Sotho with them and they seem loath to punish a white man who gives them respect and speaks their own language. From one point of view, this may be seen as corruption because a state official has received a gratification (respect) from an offender and has subsequently not fined that offender . This may however also be seen as “good policing” because the officer used his or discretion in this case .
The proposed anti-corruption strategy offers traffic officials a language through which they may account for their actions as good policing and use the negotiated character of traffic police encounters as resources for such “documentary methods”. Heritage traces Garfinkel’s use of this term thus; “Garfinkel derived the term from Mannheim who proposed that the documentary method involves the search for ‘an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of different realizations of meaning… the basic idea had received very considerable theoretical explication at the hands of phenomenologist from Husserl onwards…” (Heritage, 1984; p84)
These arguments allow us to understand that Transparency International’s distinction between “with the rule corruption” and “against the rule corruption” cannot be applied should this proposed anti-corruption strategy succeed. The proposed new language that will be introduced makes all corruption rule-based and clearly accountable as traffic police work.
Conclusion
Corruption for me is more than the manner in which state employees abuse their authority for personal gain. Corruption refers to the wider state of our lives and our social reality. To be corrupt is part of the essential character of our existence. Corruption is a meaning to which any number of social actions and contexts may be competently indexed. Any action we do may be seen as corrupt if we can see that we use our positions of trust for our own gratification.
Corruption is rather a negotiated social reality in which we come to understand our actions and others as immoral or unethical. Any anti-corruption strategy must take seriously the negotiated character of social life if it is to address corruption in our society.
The proposed anti-corruption strategy outlined in this paper offers a new language and a more plastic paradigm for traffic official and motorists to work with. The language of civic virtue may offer us a means for us to become more comfortable with ourselves as a people.
Bibliography and References
(Please note that I have included material that I have read that may not be directly referenced in the paper because I believe that my understanding of the topic has involved a wider reading than the texts quoted)
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